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Financing for the global environment is scattered among many institutions and, without an 
overview of total financial flows, often considered scarce. This issue brief begins an analysis 
of the financial landscape by focusing on the anchor institution for the global environment, 
the UN Environment Programme. It examines the relationship between institutional form and 
funding and offers insights into innovative financing. 
In 1972, at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Swe-
den, the governments of 113 countries agreed to create the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). Upon its establishment, UNEP received a mandate to institutionalize 
the integrative concept of the “environment” across existing UN agencies and to improve 
cooperation and communication between them. Catalyzing and coordinating environmen-
tal action within the UN system and beyond were among the core functions of the new, 
anchor institution for the global environment.1 To assist in the effective fulfillment of these 
functions, the governments instituted UNEP’s Environment Fund, which would finance the 
costs of new environmental initiatives within the UN system and assist developing coun-
tries with their environmental actions. Over time, however, the Environment Fund became 
the primary mechanism for financing UNEP’s own programs rather than those of the UN 
system. Moreover, while the environmental agenda expanded, the Fund’s resources de-
creased in real terms. 
Expanding the donor base, increasing funds availability, and ensuring stable and predict-
able financial flows are currently top priorities in international environmental governance. 
Contemporary institutional reform proposals, therefore, emphasize the need for innovative 
financial mechanisms for the environment.2 Some scholars and policy makers also argue 
for a change in UNEP’s institutional status from a programme, a subsidiary body in the 
United Nations, to a specialized agency on the grounds that its budget would then com-
prise assessed rather than voluntary contributions3 and the organization would be able to 
institute innovative financing.4 This brief analyzes the relationship between institutional 
form and funding and suggests that a simple causal argument connecting the two could be 
misleading. It also highlights the fact that UNEP’s financial mechanism, the Environment 
Fund, was envisioned as an innovative instrument for an expanding environmental agenda 
and, if revitalized, could create opportunities for securing financial resources adequate to 
the task at hand. 
Institutional Form and Funding: What Causality? 
Compared with most of its peers, UNEP’s annual budget of $217 million is small, espe-
cially in light of its ambitious mandate to “provide leadership and encourage partner-
ship in caring for the environment.” Many of the specialized agencies–ILO, UNESCO, 
FAO, and WHO—have annual budgets ranging from $360 million to $2.3 billion (see 
Figure 1). Some scholars explain UNEP’s lower level of financing by its status as a 
UN subsidiary body and the requisite reliance on voluntary contributions. Special-
ized agencies, they argue, “can avail themselves of more resources and hence influ-
ence.”5 The assumption linking the institutional form of a specialized agency to a 
large financial base and therefore influence could, however, be misleading. 
While some specialized agencies have budgets larger than UNEP’s, others’ 
resources are comparable or even smaller—WTO, UNIDO, and WMO, for 
example (see Figure 1 and accompanying legend for the full names of the 
organizations). In addition, voluntary contributions do not automatically 
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translate into low volume. Indeed, the data in Figure 1 point 
to the opposite. The four largest annual budgets in the UN sys-
tem for 2010 (in excess of $3 billion per year) are those of four 
subsidiary bodies that rely solely on voluntary funding—UNDP, 
WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. Figure 1 also highlights that even 
specialized agencies, whose core budget comes from assessed 
contributions, depend heavily on voluntary contributions. 
WHO, FAO and UNESCO all rely on voluntary funding for more 
than 50 percent of their budget.
Change in institutional form to a specialized agency might 
therefore not be the single most important factor that would 
lead to an increase in UNEP’s financial resources as subsidiary 
body status does not by itself limit funding. Other features, such 
as mandate, size, and location are important determinants of 
the scale of financing. Institutions with clear operational man-
dates (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR) hold significantly 
larger budgets than those with normative mandates (OCHA, 
WTO, and UNEP). Larger staff size and multiple locations also 
require larger resources. What the financial data also show, 
however, is that institutional authority and influence do not 
derive from resources alone. The World Trade Organization, an 
oft-cited example of significant global influence, operates with 
a budget at the lower end of the spectrum. 
Three critical concerns about environmental financing require 
immediate attention by scholars and by policymakers: 1) roles 
that governments and the public at large expect international 
organizations to perform, 2) adequacy of available funds for ef-
fective delivery of these purposes, and 3) reliability of resource 
flows. Operational and normative roles require different levels 
of financing. In the environmental field, a number of organiza-
tions perform both roles without the necessary coordination 
and collaboration often resulting in duplication and inefficient 
use of resources.6 As the environmental agenda expands and 
environmental activities become embedded into most organi-
zations at national and international levels, it is critical to as-
sess both the resources available and the resources necessary 
to deliver the requisite results. To date, however, there has been 
no comprehensive overview of environmental funding. Proposals 
for a financial tracking system for the environment similar to 
the global, real-time database of humanitarian aid managed by 
UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs7 are gradu-
ally gaining traction. Finally, stability, predictability and reli-
ability of resources are critical to effective performance. UNEP’s 
financial resources have fluctuated dramatically over time as 
the subsequent analysis will show and any serious proposal for 
environmental governance reform needs to address the root 
causes of these oscillations.  
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Figure 1: Annual budgets of select UN bodies for 2010, in millions of current USD
Budget data sources: Annual reports and other official documents on the organizations’ websites. See Endnotes.
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation
ILO: International Labor Organisation
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP: UN Development Programme
UNEP: UN Environment Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
UNFPA: UN Population Fund
UNHCR: UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees 
UNICEF: UN Children’s Fund
UNIDO: UN Industrial Organisation 
WFP: World Food Programme 
WHO: World Health Organisation 
WMO: World Meteorological Organisation 
WTO: World Trade Organisation 
Purpose and Performance of the Environment 
Fund
Seeking to ensure that “efforts to improve the global environ-
ment [do not] go forward without the means to act,” the United 
States led the creation of a United Nations Environment Fund 
providing both the intellectual concept and 40 percent of the 
Fund’s resources. In his address to the US Congress on 8 Febru-
ary 1972, President Richard Nixon proposed the creation of the 
Fund “with an initial funding goal of $100 million for the first 5 
years … to help to stimulate international cooperation on envi-
ronmental problems by supporting a centralized coordination 
point for United Nations activities in this field.”8 The President 
acted on the recommendation of the US Secretary of State’s 
Advisory Committee on the 1972 UN Conference on the Hu-
man Environment, a group of scholars and policymakers who 
produced extensive analysis of all aspects of the conference in 
preparation for the US position. 
The committee’s original proposal of the Environment Fund 
suggested that the largest consumers of energy contribute on 
an escalating curve to the fund: “A formula derived from each 
nation’s consumption of energy could provide the basis for the 
suggested participation in the United Nations Voluntary Fund 
for the Environment. Or, it might provide the basis for a long-
range system of funding, which could be a matter of assessment 
rather than voluntary participation.”9 Governments, however, 
did not implement this idea of energy-pegged contributions, 
which would be predictable and fair and encourage a shift to-
ward sustainable energy production and consumption. 
Rather, they agreed to create the voluntary Environment Fund 
to support UNEP’s catalyzing and coordinating role in the UN 
system. The voluntary character of the contributions allowed 
President Nixon to approve $40 million in US funding for the 
new UN body without excessive Congressional oversight at a 
time when the United States was cutting funding to the United 
Nations. While the Fund comprised solely voluntary contri-
butions, its proponents in the US State Department acknowl-
edged that industrialized countries held a responsibility to im-
prove environmental conditions and should provide the bulk of 
the finances required. Participation by smaller nations—with 
symbolic amounts of $1,000 per year—was encouraged as a 
means of emphasizing that all have a stake in international 
environmental protection.10 An allocation from the UN regular 
budget would cover the costs of servicing UNEP’s Governing 
Council and the Secretariat.11 
Importantly, the initial vision for the Environment Fund em-
phasized the expectation that its resources would increase 
as the environmental agenda expanded. The US Secretary of 
State’s Advisory Committee wrote about the Fund:
…we believe that $100 million is a beginning. How-
ever, this amount should be viewed as a minimum, 
a starting figure. It is not yet clear how much money 
will be required for adequate environmental action. 
The Voluntary Fund should be of such size as to guar-
antee that financing will not be a limiting factor to all 
necessary action. United States participation in this 
Fund should be exemplary and a reflection of the fact 
that we are the world’s major polluter.12
Following the US lead, thirty-two governments contributed to 
the Environment Fund in its first year and almost double—60 
governments—contributed in UNEP’s second biennium, 1974–
1975. Over time, the Environment Fund grew from $60 mil-
lion per biennium in the 1970s, when the organization gained 
ground, to close to $180 million in 2008–2009. This threefold 
increase in the capitalization of the Environment Fund is only 
true, however, in nominal (or current) contributions.13 In real 
terms, the Environment Fund plummeted by 44 percent from 
1977 to 1987 and has not yet reached the highs of $160 million 
per biennium that UNEP attracted in the 1970s and then in the 
early 1990s in the run-up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 
The four-decade trend depicted in Figure 2 thus shows that the 
original intention to grow the Fund proportional with intensi-
fying environmental problems was never truly realized. To the 
contrary, over time, countries decreased their investments in 
the Environment Fund. This dynamic is not true for all individ-
ual governments. Only a few countries’ contributions to the En-
vironment Fund (the United States, Japan, Russian Federation) 
have decreased significantly in real terms (Figure 3). However, 
since UNEP’s donor base is very narrow—only fifteen countries 
account for about 90 percent of the Environment Fund contri-
butions—fluctuations in government priorities and attention 
can be particularly impactful. Thus, despite the rise in Environ-
ment Fund contributions by the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Italy, and others, the cumulative effect has been 
negative. 
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Change in institutional form to a specialized agency might not be the single 
most important factor that would lead to an increase in UNEP’s financial 
resources since subsidiary body status does not by itself limit funding. 
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Figure 2: Environment Fund overview, in current and constant USD
The Soviet Union, the fifth-largest donor to the Environment 
Fund (Figure 4), is a case in point. The country had been a 
significant contributor to UNEP in financial terms as well as 
through political, technical, and human resources support un-
til it ceased to exist in 1991. On average, the Soviet Union con-
tributed approximately $7.3 million a year to UNEP’s Environ-
ment Fund from 1975 to 1991. Soviet contributions accounted 
for 12.1 percent of the Environment Fund during that period. 
By comparison, the United States contributed 28.6 percent of 
the Environment Fund during the same time, the United King-
dom 5.7 percent, and France 4.0 percent. From 1992 to 2009, the 
Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation, oversaw a de-
cline in contributions to $0.47 million a year (0.8 percent of the 
Environment Fund). UNEP thus lost one of its most significant 
donor countries, and the downward trend in the Environment 
Fund illustrated in Figure 2 can be explained partly by the dis-
appearance of the Soviet Union. 
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Figure 3: Trends in the size of top 15 donor contributions to the Environment Fund, 1972–2009, in constant USD
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Figure 4: Top 15 Environment Fund contributors, 1972–2009,  
in millions of constant USD
Widening and deepening UNEP’s donor base is indeed nec-
essary. In reality, 35 percent of UNEP’s donor countries have 
contributed less than what in 1972 was considered a symbol-
ic amount—$1,000 per year, or $5,000 per year in 2009 terms. 
Thus, even an expansion of UNEP’s donor base, while neces-
sary, is not sufficient. A system of minimum contributions as 
envisioned at the time of the Environment Fund’s creation 
might be a useful complementary mechanism. The Voluntary 
Indicative Scale of Contributions (VISC) that UNEP initiated 
in 2003 might offer a foundation on which to build a more ro-
bust financing system that would ensure stable, adequate, and 
predictable funding for UNEP. The issues surrounding the VISC 
system will be discussed in a subsequent Issue Brief in this series.
Earmarked Contributions: Control or Accountability 
Similar to other UN bodies, the voluntary contributions that 
make up most of UNEP’s financial basket are delivered in 
two ways: either through a general contribution to core fund-
ing through the Environment Fund or through contributions 
to specific elements of UNEP’s work program and projects 
via earmarked funds. Earmarked funding for UNEP began in 
the 1980s, grew significantly over the 1990s, and eventually 
eclipsed the share of the Environment Fund during the last de-
cade (Figure 5). Currently, two-thirds of UNEP’s budget com-
prises earmarked funds and only one-third comes directly from 
the Environment Fund. 
Earmarked funding has increased across the United Nations 
and is an important part of the budget even for specialized 
agencies. The World Health Organization, for example, relied 
on voluntary contributions for 72 percent of its budget in 2006–
2007.14 Assessed contributions, the hallmark of a specialized 
agency status, comprised less than a third of WHO’s financial 
base. This reliance on earmarks has been a controversial devel-
opment as the engagement of donor governments has shifted 
from unrestricted core funding to strategic investments fo-
cusing on program priorities compatible with donor agendas. 
From the perspective of the recipient organizations, earmarked 
funding asserts the influence and control of donor govern-
ments’ diminishing predictability and flexibility of resources as 
well as the autonomy of the organization to pursue program 
priorities. For donor governments, such funds ensure targeted 
accountability and allow for greater flexibility in mobilizing 
funds for a particular purpose.
In the environmental field, the earmarks trend took hold with 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer,15 which entered into force in 1989. The Montreal Pro-
tocol is considered one of the most successful international 
environmental treaties and has the largest trust fund within 
UNEP. The significant financial resources devoted to the treaty 
can be seen both as a reason for and an indicator of the treaty’s 
effectiveness. From 1988 to 2009, governments have invested 
$2.5 billion in the Montreal Protocol—an amount equivalent 
to combined Environment Fund and earmarked contributions 
during that period. Such large, sustained investment could be 
the main reason for the success of the Montreal Protocol. The 
magnitude and consistency of investment, however, can also 
be construed to indicate that governments are willing to con-
tribute because the Montreal Protocol has delivered results. In 
reality, these two dynamics reinforce each other. Significant ini-
tial investment was critical to the fund’s success and the initial 
success stimulated sustained investment. Figure 6 illustrates 
the priority governments have accorded Montreal Protocol ac-
tivities in comparison with the Environment Fund and other 
earmarked funding. 
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about 90 percent of the Environment Fund contributions — fluctuations in 
government priorities and attention can be particularly impactful.
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Conclusion
In 1972, governments created the Environment Fund to enable 
UNEP to serve as the anchor institution for the global environ-
ment through enticing collaboration from the rest of the UN 
system and providing funds for bridging the policy-implemen-
tation gap through new revenue streams for implementation. 
The Fund was the core environmental financing mechanism in 
the UN system in the 1970s and 1980s. With the proliferation 
of additional funds and earmarked contributions, however, 
the linkage between policy goals and financing instruments 
weakened, donor contributions fluctuated and decreased in 
real terms, and the Fund (and even UNEP as a whole) was ulti-
mately eclipsed by alternative financing mechanisms. 
Given the political demand for improvements in international 
environmental governance, three main dynamics in environ-
mental financing demand further attention by scholars and 
governments. First, it is important to clearly articulate the 
roles of institutions with environmental mandates and ensure 
a more systematic and coherent division of labor in the inter-
national system. Operational activities may demand larger 
resources while normative mandates require greater stability 
and predictability of financial streams. Second, an assessment 
of available versus required resources is a necessary condition 
for effective environmental governance. A financial tracking 
system to monitor and evaluate environmental financial flows, 
volumes, and impacts is therefore urgently necessary. Third, re-
liability of funding needs to be improved significantly to avoid 
a short-term focus and improve the ability to commit to and 
implement visionary programs and activities. 
To this end, the original idea for UNEP’s Environment Fund 
merits new attention. An environmental financing mechanism 
for core program work could comprise contributions calculat-
ed on the basis of countries’ energy consumption. This could 
transform into assessed contributions that would ensure pre-
dictable funding on a scale proportional to the relative size of 
environmental impact. In addition, a scheme of voluntary con-
tributions with a specific minimum from all countries would 
provide the resources necessary to supplement existing pro-
grams and launch new and innovative initiatives. 
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